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Abstract
This paper addresses the question of whether and how public action via civil society and/or government can meaningfully 
shape industry-wide corporate responsibility (ICR) behaviour. We explore how, in principle, ICR can come about and 
what conditions might be effective in promoting more ethical behaviour. We propose a framework to understand attempts 
to develop more responsible behaviour at an industry level through processes of negotiation and coalition building. We 
suggest that any attempt to meaningfully influence ICR would require stakeholders to possess both power and legitimacy; 
moreover, magnitude and urgency of the issue at stake may affect the ability to influence ICR. The framework is applied to 
the retail banking industry, focusing on post-crisis experiences in two countries—Spain and the UK—where there has been 
considerable pressure on the retail banking industry by civil society and/or government to change behaviours, especially to 
abandon unethical practices. We illustrate in this paper how corporate responsibility at the sector level in retail banking is 
the product of context-specific processes of negotiation between civil society and public authorities, on behalf of customers 
and other stakeholders, drawing on legal and other institutions to influence industry behaviour.
Keywords Corporate responsibility · Industry corporate responsibility · Business ethics · Retail banking · Stakeholder 
negotiation · Bank business model · Financial services · Spain · UK
Abbreviations
BBA  British Bankers Association (now UK Finance)
CR  Corporate responsibility
CSR  Corporate social responsibility
FCA  Financial conduct authority
GFC  Great financial crisis
ICR  Industry corporate responsibility
MYM  Move your money
PAH  Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (Plat-
form of People Affected by Mortgages)
PCA  Personal current account
PLC  Public Limited Company
PPI  Payment protection insurance
SB  Savings bank
SME  Small and medium size enterprises
TCF  Treating customers fairly
Introduction
The scrutiny by governments, non-government organisations 
and civil society that followed the Great Financial Crisis 
highlighted how banks can abuse their position as power-
ful economic intermediaries in pursuit of shareholder value 
creation. In particular, banks were observed to engage in 
value extraction through fees or speculative activities disem-
bedded from the real economy (Muellerleile 2013) and have 
collectively resisted calls for change, despite significant and 
sustained national and international uproar about unethical 
practices. This is important for two reasons in relation to 
the wider importance of banking in everyday economic and 
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social life. First, as providers of banking, credit, insurance 
and other services for small- and medium-sized business, 
retail banks fulfil important intermediary and enabling func-
tions (Froud et al. 2017). Second, access to finance through 
bank accounts and other financial services is essential for 
citizens’ economic and social participation (Schmidt et al. 
1999; Allen and Santomero 1998). In this sense, retail bank-
ing is a foundational infrastructure (Froud et al. 2018). Yet 
instead of ensuring this basic functionality, banks’ actions to 
defend profitability have had deleterious effects on their cus-
tomers, including mis-selling of financial products, collapse 
of small business lending, mortgage foreclosure and retail 
branch closures (Froud et al. 2017; Paulet et al. 2015; Vives-
Miró and Gutiérrez 2017). These behaviours are contrary to 
those we might expect from banks as socially responsible 
actors; and they are in contrast to the positive impact banks 
can have on financial inclusion, economic and social devel-
opment (Fernández-Olit and de la Cuesta-González 2014).
In principle, curbs on unethical bank behaviour could 
result from government action, investor-led initiatives or 
other pressures from external actors, whereby organisations 
are compelled or at least encouraged to meet wider stake-
holder interests. Governments have tended to see this as the 
role of investors, and many businesses (including banks) 
have adopted investor-led corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) initiatives to address expectations related to broader 
impacts on society, the economy and the environment (de 
Bakker et al. 2013; Doh and Guay 2006; Schaltegger and 
Burritt 2010; Steurer 2010). This positivist or instrumental 
approach to CSR recognises stakeholder demands for the 
primary purpose of sustaining or improving profitability and 
shareholder value (Esteban-Sánchez et al. 2017) but leaves 
limited opportunity to meaningfully alter business models 
or the ethical foundations of business (Sternberg 2011). 
This approach is also centred on easily quantifiable aspects 
of responsibility (Maniora 2017) more than the impact of 
their intermediary activity on customer welfare and society 
(Fernández-Olit and de la Cuesta-González 2014). In this 
sense, corporate responsibility has often been a documentary 
artefact accounting for the positive impact of the business on 
society in annual accounts or standalone reports rather than 
providing meaningful accounts of ethical business behaviour 
(Coupland 2006, p. 3).
Such reporting therefore becomes a way of recognising 
aspects of behaviour that a firm can address—employee 
diversity or carbon emission reduction programmes, or addi-
tions such as sponsoring activities (Gao and Bansall 2013)—
without business ethics effectively incorporated into deci-
sions about the underlying business model (Maniora 2017; 
Sternberg 2011). It is not surprising then that critical observ-
ers suggest these instrumental approaches to CSR represent 
corporate ‘window dressing’, in which social responsibility 
is treated as an add-on to core operations (Frankental 2001; 
Lewis 2016; Schaltegger and Burritt 2010). Such initiatives 
do not in themselves embed and normalise responsible 
behaviour. Indeed, the recurrence of socially and economi-
cally irresponsible or unethical behaviour by firms individu-
ally and collectively raises questions about whether organ-
isation-level actions can provide a meaningful approach to 
tackle (fundamental) problems characterising an industry 
(Fernández-Olit et al. 2019).
Drawing on these important themes, this paper considers 
responsibility initiatives affecting firms across an industry 
which are the outcome of actions by industry stakeholder 
coalitions rather than arising through voluntaristic action. 
Such actions are considerably rarer than instrumental, firm-
level CSR, despite efforts by civil society to scale up collab-
orations to target a whole industry (Den Hond et al. 2014). 
The benefit of assuming an industry perspective lies in what 
Beschorner and Hajduk (2017) call ‘the downscaling effect’: 
within an industry context, responsibility can be substanti-
ated and thus made clear and manageable for companies and 
their stakeholders. The industry-level corporate responsibil-
ity (ICR) framework draws attention to ‘interactions between 
businesses, NGOs, political actors and other organisations’, 
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Beschorner 2004) which may 
be more evident at an industry rather than an individual firm 
level. In the specific case of retail banking considered in this 
paper, ‘reform’ ambitions emerged before, during and after 
the crisis, reflecting a significant gap between bank behav-
iour and expectations of fair and effective financial services 
held by civil society, private and business customers. Mis-
selling of financial products, closure of bank branches (espe-
cially in rural areas), failure to lend to small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as irresponsible lending 
on property have variously emerged as endemic problems 
requiring sector-level action (Fernández-Olit et al. 2019; 
Froud et al. 2017).
The paper addresses the question of whether and how pub-
lic action (via civil society and/or government) can meaning-
fully affect industry-wide corporate responsibility behaviour. 
Where problems extend over a sector and challenge the basic 
function of retail banks from a stakeholder perspective, have 
actions to improve corporate responsibility been coordinated 
rather than left to the discretion of individual banks? To 
explore these issues, we focus on post-crisis experiences in 
two countries, Spain and the UK. These are chosen because, 
in both cases, there has been considerable pressure from civil 
society on the retail banking industry to abandon certain activ-
ities (mis-selling, repossessions) or counteract others (failure 
to lend to SMEs) to curb negative impacts on customers. Here, 
retail banks are economic and political actors (Matten et al. 
2003; Scherer et al. 2006) and corporate responsibilities are 
primarily viewed as reaction to wider changes in societal insti-
tutions (Dubbink 2004) and to civil society ambition to shift 
corporate attention and resources towards societal challenges 
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(Scherer and Palazzo 2011). Socially responsible bank behav-
iour is therefore not simply an outcome of immediate stake-
holder pressures, but a response to democratic forces to curb 
corporate power towards enacting public needs (Driver and 
Thompson 2002; Parker 2002).
Our analysis engages critically with Beschorner et al.’s 
(2013, p. 26f) conception of ICR as embedded in sector-spe-
cific collaborative efforts between firms, government and other 
stakeholders. Coalition building and alignment of interests are 
key success factors. However, the emphasis on ICR as collabo-
ration can obfuscate the role of stakeholders in bringing about 
that change in the absence of industry engagement. Therefore 
we introduce an alternative view of ICR as a politically charged 
negotiation between industry and its stakeholders. We choose 
retail banking to explore these themes because this industry 
has been overwhelmingly inactive in responding to problems 
caused collectively by its members. Rather, as explored in this 
paper, it has been civil society—with public authorities pro-
viding necessary though limited support—which has played 
a key role in recognising problems and engaging retail banks 
through a process of negotiated responsibility. From a bank 
perspective, such responsibility is reactive, or even coerced, 
not developed internally (see, for example, Scholte 2013).
This analysis acknowledges that industries (and firms as 
their constituent actors) are primarily concerned with their 
ability to continue with business-as-usual and may not initiate 
change, especially when profits will be affected. With this in 
mind, we show that ICR is driven by powerful and legitimate 
interventions from civil society and government. We focus on 
these actors not because they are the only possible agents of 
change, but because they have the capacity to campaign for, 
or to pressure industry members to adopt more responsible 
behaviours.
The next part of the paper explores the concept of ICR 
and the role of interest alignment and coalition building in 
achieving a change in ethical behaviours. The Spanish and 
UK retail banking sectors are introduced in the third section, 
which outlines the extent of corporate responsibility initiatives 
since 2008. The fourth section then takes two examples to 
explore the role of civil society in negotiations that eventually 
led to actions. While notable, the impact of these actions is 
limited: successful actions have been fragmentary and indus-
try behaviour remains largely reactive, constituting individual 
redress rather than a more generalised ethical orientation. The 
implications are considered in the final section.
Coalitions and Industry‑Level Corporate 
Responsibility
In this section, we outline and develop the concept of 
industry-level corporate responsibility to explore how 
stakeholders may be able to negotiate through coalitions 
and alignments of interests to affect the operation of firms 
in an industry. The analysis draws on the literature to 
address two questions: first, how in principle ICR might 
come about, either through industry leadership or coalition 
building by stakeholders, before exploring resistances to 
change; and, second, what conditions might allow some 
actions to be more effective, including the importance of 
power, legitimacy, magnitude and urgency.
Industry Corporate Responsibility: From Proactive 
to Reactive Agendas
An industry-level approach to responsibility represents 
a relatively new understanding of how firms collectively 
engage with stakeholder interests on a voluntary basis or 
under compulsion. Beschorner et al.’s (2013, p. 26f.) ICR 
framework draws attention to ‘interactions between busi-
nesses, NGOs, political actors and other organisations’, to 
secure the adoption of corporate responsibility policies 
as a specific ‘organisational field’ (Powell and DiMaggio 
1991; Beschorner 2004). For this to be successful, busi-
ness, civil society and government actors necessarily share 
assumptions about what corporate responsibility means 
in a specific industry context. Beschorner et al. (2013) 
argue that, prior to the adoption of ICR, key stakehold-
ers (customers, worker organisations, civil society) col-
laborate and negotiate the type and extent of the policies, 
though they retain an industry-centric view, with stake-
holders taking second stage. More recently, Beschorner 
and Hajduk (2017) advocate a cultural perspective to busi-
ness ethics—cultural business ethics—within which CR 
initiatives are linked to industry-specific cultural contexts 
and institutional logics. Here they invoke the notion of 
the organisational field to situate concrete action through 
network interactions between stakeholders and core busi-
nesses to reduce bias towards the company.
It is helpful to view ICR as an interactive political pro-
cess that requires negotiation, rather than one that is either 
top down or bottom up (Dunning 2004), or indeed a com-
bination of both (Behrman 2004). However, the framing 
by Beschorner et al. (2013) and Beschorner and Hajduk 
(2017) creates an overly harmonious impression of this 
process, where, following debates and negotiation, par-
ticipants can agree on appropriate industry actions. This 
in turn assumes that agendas are meaningfully represented 
by stakeholder and industry-led coalitions. A firm’s ability 
to act is constrained by both the shared interests enshrined 
in trade association membership and the associations’ own 
interests, which can have both positive and negative social 
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outcomes (Marques 2017).1 Moreover, industry-led coali-
tions are likely to have diverse motivations, as indicated 
by Grayson and Jane (2013): they may proactively engage 
with social inequalities to pre-empt negative impact on 
industry and limit government oversight; or they may be 
a prerequisite for market access. Such coalitions can also 
be more instrumental in creating visibility for firms and 
industry to be seen as ‘responsible’ through benchmark-
ing or codification. They certainly mobilise resources 
and provide a strategic space in which industry positions 
can be consolidated to engage external actors, including 
government and civil society (ibid 50f.). Coalitions may, 
therefore, be pre-occupied with controlling the narrative 
to legitimate their collective actions, for example, by set-
ting responsibility agendas that are impactful but limit the 
effect on industry business models (Du and Vieira, 2012).
Given these different possible motives, industry-led 
responsibility is likely to imply a limited notion of respon-
sibility that is commensurate with shareholder value priori-
ties and some highly codified, ‘ethics-light’ additions to the 
business model (Raiborn and Payne 1990). CR actions that 
are expected to reduce profits for any adopters will disincen-
tivise collective action (Sternberg 2011); and other actions 
which may allow some firms to enhance profits may be 
subject to firm-level gatekeeping, not industry-level action 
(Doane 2005). Under some circumstances industry can 
organise through self-regulatory institutions, for example, 
as ‘green clubs’ to provide collective guidance and control 
behaviour of members (Marques 2017; Beschorner et al. 
2017). For example, Tischer and Remer (2016) illustrate 
how social banking associations self-regulate conduct and 
work towards common goals that seek to benefit society and 
environment. Extension of this to the whole of the banking 
sector, however, is problematic because it requires agree-
ment on what is ‘right’ and what is ‘practical’ (Raiborn 
and Payne 1990, p. 885). In other instances, ‘industry-led’ 
coalitions at the national and global scale are a response 
to improved coordination between civil society actors who 
may focus on industry directly, rather than government indi-
rectly to enact change (Grayson and Jane 2013; Scherer and 
Palazzo 2011). For example, recognition by civil society 
that ‘target setting’ or ‘best practice’ initiatives by govern-
ment encourage industry adherence to minimum standards, 
rather than seeking transformative action, can encourage 
more direct or disruptive actions to pressure companies and 
industries to change (de Bakker et al. 2013). Under such cir-
cumstances, it is harder for industry-led initiatives to engage 
constructively with more fundamental, normative notions of 
ethical behaviour.
Stakeholder Coalitions as Drivers of ICR
Drawing on these arguments, our framework focuses on 
how government and civil society can enable and influ-
ence ICR. Figure 1 illustrates key interactions or path-
ways between civil society, government and industry to 
enhance ICR, as well as sources of resistance. In response 
to external pressure, industry may individually or col-
lectively engage tactics such as lobbying or reporting; 
while government has means to enable or to obstruct civil 
society’s ability to promote pressures for change (Clark 
2011). Ultimately the power of either civil society or 
government to change industry-wide behaviour is limited 
(Dentchev et al. 2017; Carberry et al. 2017). For exam-
ple, while civil society has developed persuasive (media 
campaigns, shareholder resolutions) and disruptive (boy-
cotts, collective legal action) tactics, it lacks the ability to 
coerce firms directly into adopting ICR (Carberry et al. 
2017). Governments at different levels often approach ICR 
through generic policy responses which are often fairly 
ineffective. The EU, for example, is integrating ‘sustain-
ability’ into a broad financial policy framework in order to 
mobilise finance for sustainable growth with support from 
industry and investors (European Commission 2018) as 
well as driving industry and government alliances, to the 
detriment of civil society which is insufficiently included 
in these approaches (Moon and Vogel 2008). However, 
industry involvement in new sustainable finance policies 
could explain, for example, the slow pace of the review 
Fig. 1  Influences on industry corporate responsibility. Source: 
authors
1 Industry political donations in the US illustrate actions that seeks 
to protect ability to generate profits over responsible behaviour. This 
is particularly prevalent in finance, energy and transport who fund 
political campaigns (OpenSecrets, 2019) seeking to avert regulation 
despite strong evidence that doing so harms society at large.
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of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2) and the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD 5), as well as the 
exclusion of an external evaluator in the new EU green 
bond standard (European Commission 2020).
Even if we share Den Hond and de Bakker’s (2007) 
optimism that civil society activism can influence firm 
behaviour directly, doing so may be more difficult when 
such activism targets general, rather than specific, behav-
ioural change of an industry. This is particularly the case 
where change means not simply ceasing specific practices 
but developing a more ethical approach to future choices 
and activities. However, by aligning its interests with 
government, civil society may be capable of influencing 
cultural and regulatory conditions of an industry; in other 
words, it can create a political environment for the diffu-
sion of its objectives (Carberry et al. 2017). The ability of 
civil society to re-politicise what is increasingly an attempt 
by government to institutionalise CR (Moon and Vogel 
2008) holds government more accountable in enforcing 
legal obligations and societal values. In doing so, it creates 
a set of legitimate pressures on business to act responsibly. 
But, industry and government can also frustrate civil soci-
ety ambitions to drive ICR: for example, industry associa-
tions can resist change while also lobbying government; 
or industry-government relations may become shaped by 
revolving-door arrangements or other forms of capture that 
undermine third-party initiatives, including by displacing 
the agenda onto more trivial or peripheral issues (Tashman 
and Raelin 2013). This leads to our second question: what 
conditions might allow some actions—including coalitions 
or alignments of interest—to be more effective in produc-
ing meaningful ICR?
To identify potential factors that might shape ICR we 
draw on Mitchell et al. (1997), Neville et al. (2011) and 
Ali (2017) to highlight a range of features—power, legiti-
macy, urgency and magnitude—which in some combination 
might lead to industry-level initiatives. Mitchell et al. (1997) 
develop a conceptual analysis of stakeholder salience based 
on power, legitimacy and urgency, while others propose dif-
ferent typologies to help explain a greater degree of stake-
holder orientation in proactive firms (Neville et al. 2011; Ali 
2017). In trying to understand how specific industry-level 
initiatives might come about, the framework also needs to 
incorporate how stakeholders (civil society and/or govern-
ment) can create the conditions to promote responsibility 
without direct or proactive involvement of individual com-
panies. This contrasts with an assumed need for stakeholders 
to capture the attention of companies or work with them 
directly, which is prevalent in firm-centred CR debates.
Stakeholder Salience: Power, Legitimacy, Urgency 
and Magnitude
In line with the literature on stakeholder salience reviewed 
by Neville et al. (2011), we suggest that attempts to mean-
ingfully influence ICR would require stakeholders to pos-
sess both power and legitimacy. Unlike Myllykangas et al. 
(2010), the notion of power defined as having ‘power over’ 
[emphasis original] must be relaxed to include ‘power to’ 
engage others in the process given the collaborative nature 
of negotiation. In line with these authors’ exploration of 
legitimacy as socially constructed and the general percep-
tion that stakeholder involvement is ‘desirable, proper, or 
appropriate’, we consider that power must equally be seen 
in relation to the action performed and the actors involved. 
The contextualisation required to make sense of power and 
legitimacy is provided through accounting for urgency and 
magnitude. Urgency is more widely adopted in discussions 
of stakeholder salience (see Tashman and Raelin 2013) 
defined as the degree to which claims require immediate 
action, both in terms of time but also recognising criticality 
of the form within the specific context (Myllykangas et al. 
2010). However, little reference is made to the magnitude 
of required change. Where authors focus on magnitude, 
they do so in terms of consequences (Brown et al. 2016) 
or ‘significance’ of change (Shropshire and Hillman 2007). 
However, we argue that magnitude of change can also use-
fully address the complexity of the task at hand, not just in 
terms of significance or consequence but also in terms of 
the relational work that is required as part of the negotiation. 
Getting a single actor to commit to sizeable change is dif-
ficult enough; but successfully enacting magnitudinal change 
across an industry is likely to be more difficult, especially 
when competitive agendas collide. Urgency and magnitude 
of the proposed action therefore both affect the ability to 
influence ICR, including attempts to develop more respon-
sible behaviour at an industry level through processes of 
negotiation and coalition building.
Collaborations between civil society and government are 
therefore likely to be beneficial where substantive and/or 
immediate change is required to effect more ethical behav-
iour at industry level. For example, the MoveYourMoney 
campaign, initially driven by civil society actors from 2009, 
led to the UK government creation of the Current Account 
Switching Service (CASS) in 2013 (Seyfang and Gilbert-
Squires 2019; Tischer 2013). In this case, the independent 
power and legitimacy of civil society and government was 
enhanced by collaborative efforts: when government joined 
the civil society campaign, the impact was scaled up from 
half a million bank customers switching accounts prior to the 
introduction of CASS to 5 million since (Tischer 2013; Pay.
uk 2019). Here, successful collaboration follows individual 
attempts to seek influence. Initial differences are overcome 
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as actors consolidate and extend power and legitimacy, for 
example, through formal electoral support from society, or 
less formally through campaigns. This can happen without 
the explicit support of the industry and even where there is 
active resistance reflecting concerns for the profitability of 
members.
Understanding CR initiatives as a process of negotiation 
between key actors illustrates the complexity inherent in 
improving responsibility at industry level and the role of 
different groups. Changes that result from pressure by gov-
ernment or civil society for change, leading to legislative or 
other actions, may be different to CR actions initiated by the 
sector. Holzer (2008, p. 59f) unravels some of the complex 
interactions between those seeking change (external coali-
tions) and the affected firms. In particular, he notes the pro-
pensity of diverse coalitions with dispersed power to assume 
a passive role during negotiations as control over the process 
is internalised by the firms’ top management. Such internali-
sation may also occur at the level of the industry, to either 
reject or accept change, facilitated by industry associations. 
Coalitions, however, are brittle: they may be dominated by 
a set of actors or they may be divided and seek to influence 
ICR independently, which can damage legitimacy. All of 
these may enable or disable action by management across 
the industry to resist pressure for ICR; and it may therefore 
limit the power by civil society and government to affect 
industry behaviour (Holzer 2008). In other words, manage-
ment (or its representative trade body) may assume the role 
of political broker, enabling them to strategically manage 
stakeholder coalition interests or avert external influence 
(Campbell 2007, p. 955).
If, however, ICR initiatives are to be understood as 
resulting from pressure of outside parties—civil society 
or government—what kind of power is implied, both in 
making change and in resisting it? Some instances of 
power seem straightforward: government passes a law 
that requires a specific behavioural change and instructs 
a regulatory agency to enforce it. This results in a very 
narrow kind of ICR because it reflects compliance rather 
than voluntary recognition of inherent stakeholder interest. 
In the absence of voluntary action, desired changes may 
be sought via incentive systems or by introducing prin-
ciples or frameworks that encourage better outcomes but 
do not compel firms to adopt or desist from any particular 
practices. Power here takes a more social form (Dowd-
ing 1996; Lukes 2005), which reflects the ability of an 
actor (such as civil society or public authorities) to entice 
and shape, rather than force, the actions of others (such 
as retail banks), thus ‘furthering their own interests and/
or affecting the interests of others’ (Lukes 2005, p. 65). 
Power is also revealed through the extent to which one 
actor (here, business) can decide how (if at all) to respond 
to the stakeholder initiative (Lukes 1976, p. 129). In some 
cases, business may resist all attempts at enrollment by 
civil society and/or government, especially if there is no 
(prospect of) legal requirement or a lack of collective pub-
lic interest.
The absence of industry-led CR might reflect some 
degree of industry power vis a vis other interests—a 
belief that no significant consequences may follow from 
inaction—as much as a lack of organisation, even where 
there may be legitimate concerns. Power is, however, often 
contingent and it may be mediated or created by specific 
circumstances. Business or industry perceptions about 
when action is necessary will also reflect the context, as 
civil society or government responses to evolving prob-
lems. As such, aspects of power and legitimacy afforded to 
civil society and government are context and time specific, 
not permanent or enduring attributes. Once irresponsible 
behaviour is corrected, actors may reorganise resources to 
focus on alternative issues (Roloff 2008).
The framework, therefore, needs to reflect the magni-
tude of the issue and the urgency with which it must be 
addressed; these might empower or alternatively under-
mine the strength of coalitions or the ability of civil soci-
ety to negotiate. For example, proposed ICR actions may 
affect a set of firms across an industry equally, or dis-
proportionately affect a subset of the actors by virtue of 
process or product characteristics. The reasons for such 
considerations become clear if we think about what is at 
stake. In pushing for new, agenda-setting ethical policies 
or actions that affect all players within an industry the 
stakes are relatively high and, therefore, may be met with 
more (coordinated) resistance from the industry. Seeking 
to influence behaviour across an industry thus may require 
considerable resource to be spent compared to situations 
in which one firm is the target of civil society and/or gov-
ernment action. In other cases, urgency (at least as per-
ceived by civil society and/or government) may become 
a more important driver and traditional forms of nego-
tiation involving consultation and discussion (Campbell 
2007) may not deliver desired outcomes. Thus, the nature 
of negotiation may be issue-specific, reflecting how power 
to influence and resist is distributed amongst the various 
coalition members. ‘Power’ here is to be understood as a 
fluid expression of changing contexts over time, reflecting 
the composition of and work undertaken by the coalition. 
For example, initial ambitious demands can become scaled 
down to realise more modest change; in this way, magni-
tude as a driver of significant change may be undermined 
by an urgent need to act or a willingness to compromise 
with a more incremental or superficial style of reform. Or, 
magnitude or urgency around a particular issue can allow 
civil society to mobilise additional financial, political or 
other resources that augment power and compel change.
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Industry Corporate Responsibility Initiatives 
in Retail Banking: Coalitions and Public 
Action in Spain and the UK
Corporate responsibility reports in the banking industry 
have served the principal purpose of marketing to inter-
ested stakeholders, including socially responsible investors 
and stock market index managers. From the perspective 
of the industry, this might be viewed as a cost-effective 
way to deal with the demands of interest groups and 
enhance reputation, while avoiding significant and poten-
tially costly changes to business operations and conduct. 
Although most banks have published CR reports as part of 
their annual accounts or as standalone documents before 
the crisis (Coupland 2006, p. 3), the quality and scope 
of such reporting differs considerably between banks 
(Novethic 2012, p. 5; Scholtens 2009, p. 4). Despite the 
emergence of the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines 
(GRI 2013, p. 9; Roca and Searcy 2012), there has been 
little standardisation of disclosures across the industry, 
even where specific banking reporting standards or guide-
lines have been issued. Crucially, qualitative reporting is 
unlikely to become widely established as promoters of 
ESG and sustainable principles tend to prefer readily quan-
tified data—such as greenhouse gas emissions or gender 
equality—over qualitative data (Hiss 2013). The incorpo-
ration of ESG criteria in financial product creation further 
commodifies sustainability as something that is quantifi-
able (ibid); this is underlined in EU Sustainable Finance 
Action Plan (EU Commission 2018). Industry stakeholders 
are also requesting more information on what is measured 
and how (see Freshfields 2019), though it is unclear if this 
will go beyond reporting to address bank business models 
in relation to ESGs (Siew 2015; Lyon and Maxwell 2011).
Even without an overall framework, assessment tools 
(see, for example, Novethic 2012) have been used as a 
proxy to evaluate retail bank functions, narrowly focus-
ing on easily obtainable parameters such as stakeholder 
engagement, sponsorship and social engagement, and 
financial inclusion; and some more industry-specific 
yet easily quantifiable discussions of responsible lend-
ing, responsible marketing and customer relations. The 
first three can be understood as a response to stakeholder 
demands and have (albeit minimal) cost implications; the 
latter three engage more directly with the market in sus-
taining or increasing customer numbers and lending, and 
thus are crucial to sustain profitability.
Pressure to maximise profit is deeply embedded at both 
cultural and structural levels and has persisted post-crisis 
despite public disquiet and declining returns (Froud et al. 
2017). Information asymmetries between bankers and con-
sumers, civil society and government are significant and 
are an indicator of industry power so that the ability to 
pressure banks into adopting CR initiatives is restricted 
and/or requires considerable resources to be spent (Ford 
and Philipponnat 2013; Scholte 2013). However, a greater 
public focus on banking following the crisis made those 
resources available at both government and civil society 
level, generating numerous publicly available reports (see, 
for example, on the UK: NEF 2009; CRESC 2009; LSE 
2010). While much of the high profile censure has been 
focused on investment banking—for example, widespread 
market manipulation coordinated by leading international 
financial conglomerates caused uproar internationally—
retail banking has also been characterised by industry-
wide misconduct, including mis-selling products to con-
sumers or the lack of lending to SMEs as a result of credit 
rationing (Dowell-Jones and Kinley 2011, pp. 202–203). 
Such actions have led to a lack of trust (especially of large 
banks) among customers (Hurley et al. 2014); and this is 
despite the early adoption of CR by the banking indus-
try (Soana 2011). Not surprisingly then, the opinion poll 
data show that the responses to allegations of mis-selling, 
market manipulations and so on are directed at the retail 
banking sector as a whole, not simply at individual banks 
(Populus 2017; YouGov 2018). In this post-crisis con-
text, ICR initiatives that have arisen can be understood as 
reflecting both magnitude and urgency.
To illustrate the nature and effectiveness of industry-level 
CR in retail banking, the paper considers two countries, 
Spain and the UK, where significant pressures for change by 
civil society and/or government can be identified to address 
aspects of unethical behaviour. These two countries also pro-
vide different contexts to explore post-crisis experiences in 
the same sector. Traditionally, Spain has a more coordinated 
market economy with a bank-based financial system, com-
pared with a more liberal market economy in the UK and 
a market-based financial system. Jackson and Apostolakou 
(2010) argue that different systemic environments foster dif-
ferent types of coordination between business and society, 
thereby producing distinct models or business organisations. 
However, in the specific case of retail banking there are also 
common features in terms of how responsibility concerns 
have tended to be mediated through the interests of private 
and/or business customers. As a consequence, there could 
be less potential for conflict between these (customer) stake-
holders and industry, compared with other industries where 
stakeholders may have less obvious or concentrated ‘market 
power’. Elsewhere, CR initiatives have covered broader con-
cerns about the environment or human rights, where mobi-
lising customers is only one part of the negotiations.
Nonetheless, we argue that retail banking is characterised 
by passivity despite the significant decline in trust noted 
above: public discontent with retail banking both before 
and after the crisis has brought little change in the nature 
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or extent of industry-led responsibility. Instead, attempts to 
drive responsible behaviour come either from public authori-
ties or are derived from civil society responses that mobi-
lise consumer or political power. Rather than leading ethi-
cal change, industry measures can generally be a response 
to—or compliance with—formal or regulatory initiatives. 
The lack of proactive industry change may appear surpris-
ing given public discontent after high profile mis-selling 
and eviction scandals in the UK and Spain respectively. In 
the UK, the top 10 financial scandals since 2000 have cost 
banks £67.4bn collectively (FT 2019), yet market shares of 
the major players have been relatively unaffected, reflecting 
the perceived ‘hassle’ of switching and mimetic business 
models of banks (Panther and Farquhar 2004; Froud et al. 
2017). To explore this further, we first explore the context in 
which stakeholder mobilisations took place in Spain and the 
UK. Secondly, in the next section, we take two examples and 
analyse the actions taken by civil society, the extent to which 
coalitions of interests have been formed and the outcomes of 
the initiative in terms of embedding ICR.
The Retail Banking Context in Spain and the UK
The retail banking industries of Spain and the UK are both 
characterised by a lack of diversity and, despite official 
attempts to change this, there has been an entrenchment of 
large players with similar business models and a high col-
lective market share. These are also banking systems which 
have been the subject of widespread concern around treat-
ment of customers, making them interesting cases to explore 
the nature and extent of ICR. This section uses secondary 
data to outline key trends in the retail banking industries of 
both countries, the major issues for responsibility and the 
limited nature of change overall.
Spain was severely hit by the financial crisis in 2007/08. 
The doubling of domestic lending by the banking sector 
from 100% of GDP in 1995 to 215% in 2008 (Fernández-
Olit and de la Cuesta-González 2014) illustrates the scale 
of change in banking and the economy more broadly. Much 
of this newer debt was linked to a property boom: the mar-
ket for mortgage lending was effectively created during this 
time, growing from €37.9bn in 1988 to €1065bn in 2008 
and equivalent to 61% of total outstanding lending to the 
private sector (AHE 2012). Savings banks (SBs) were the 
key players, with over half of the market for mortgages, and 
thus were most affected when the market turned in the post-
crisis recession.
Some private commercial banks and, particularly, SBs 
required substantial government assistance in the post-crisis 
era; just as significant was the shrinking of the SB sector, 
Table 1  Retail banking 
evolution of the top 10 Spanish 
banks, 2008–2018. Sources: 







Mergers & Acquision Market share at year 
end
aer 01 Jan 2013 before 31 Dec 2012 2017 2012 2008
Santander private Banco Popular Banesto 22% 19% 15%
Banif
BBVA private Caixa Catalunya Unnim 17% 15% 14%
CaixaBank private / 
savings Banco de Valencia




Bankia private / 
savings
Banco Mare 
Nostrum Caja Madrid 
11% 9% 6%
Bancaja and 5 small 
savings banks




Top 5 market share 74% 61% 47%
Bankinter private 2% 2% 2%
Ibercaja savings Caja3 2%
Unicaja savings Ceiss Caja Jaen 4% 3% 1%
Kutxabank savings Caja Vital, Kutxa & 
BBK
3% 3%
Abanca private Banco Etcheverria Nova Caixa Galicia 2% 3% 1%
Top 10 market share 87% 70% 51%
Banks participating in M&A and market share in brackets
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leaving commercial banking interests the dominant force 
(IMF 2012b) and abolishing a regional banking market 
with government participation in favour of increasing stock 
market control. Only two small SBs survived as many were 
bailed-out and converted to private banks. As Table 1 shows, 
within a 10-year period, the Spanish banking sector moved 
from a diverse industry featuring more than 60 institutions 
with different ownership structures and a regional bank-
ing market, to an increasingly consolidated and centralised 
national system dominated by stock market listed banks with 
only a dozen institutions (EBF 2013, p. 81). The number of 
credit institutions fell by 43% between 2008 and 2016, and 
by 2018 the five largest entities accounted for over 70% of 
the market (in terms of total assets), an increase of more than 
50% in ten years and significantly above the average for the 
euro zone (Cruz-Garcia et al. 2018).
As a consequence, employees and branches have been 
reduced by nearly one-third between 2008 and 2015 (Mau-
dos 2017), though Spain still has the second highest bank 
branch network density in the EU-28. While some reorgani-
sation of the banking network could be deemed necessary, 
it was initiated in a crisis context and continued in an unco-
ordinated way because this covers not simply the closure 
of branches to reduce operating costs, as in most European 
countries, but also the collapse of the savings bank sector. 
The process of consolidation and concentration (FT 2013a) 
was accompanied by a move towards a more homogeneous 
Spanish retail banking sector, with more competition and 
less collaboration between the remaining larger players as 
banks have moved out of their traditional regional bases.
Before the crisis, government action to promote CR in 
the Spanish banking sector focused on legal requirements 
on good governance, transparency and reporting. While the 
post-crisis response reflects some acknowledgement of prob-
lems, it has been limited and fairly generic. For example, the 
Spanish government followed EU and OECD guidelines on 
financial education policies to improve financial literacy; and 
initiatives to increase SME credit through the public finance 
agency (ICO) have also been developed but with little effect 
(Ayuso 2013). More significantly, the new Savings Bank 
Law (26/2013), issued to reorient SBs as a locally embed-
ded sub-sector committed to financing SMEs, had no impact 
given that most of the Spanish SBs had already vanished 
by 2013 and cannot easily be reinvented. In the absence of 
government requirements, banks have done little beyond 
‘soft’ voluntary CR in areas like transparency and financial 
education. Thus, while responsibility initiatives have come 
from government, there has been little apparent or effective 
coalition building with civil society. Nevertheless, as we will 
see in the next section, laws have emerged to protect custom-
ers from aggressive practices in retail banking as a response 
to civil society pressure and judicial judgements.
In contrast, the UK retail banking sector was charac-
terised by a high degree of concentration in a few global 
financial conglomerates well before the crisis (Cruickshank 
2000). Despite calls from government and elsewhere to 
increase competition, concentration has persisted in major 
retail banking markets (see Fig. 2), especially in personal 
current accounts (PCAs), mortgages and personal loans 
(ICB 2011, p. 166). In fact, crisis-related consolidation 
increased concentration in the UK market: the six biggest 
retail banks had a market share of more than 90% in 2010, 
and have lost less than 5% since (FCA 2018). SME accounts 
and lending have historically been even more concentrated: 
the top five retained 83% of SME current accounts (CMA 
2016), despite a recent increase in the number of challenger 
banks, including fintech. If these new banks do gain signifi-
cant market share from the big players, it is not clear that this 
will encourage more responsible behaviour. Arguably, the 
attention on cost reduction is likely to continue (including 
further branch closures) while the large banks seek to imi-
tate the digital technologies and product innovation and seek 








2008 2010 2013 2017
PCAs Top 6 Mortgages Top 6 BCAs Top 5
Fig. 2  Concentration in UK retail and SME Banking  (market share 
in %), 2008–2017. Sources: CMA 2016; FCA 2018. Notes: SME 
account concentration for England and Wales only [Scotland and 
Northern Ireland BCA markets are historically even more concen-
trated (https ://publi catio ns.parli ament .uk/pa/cm201 415/cmsel ect/
cmtre asy/204/20407 .htm)]; BCA data for 2017 are estimates
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As in Spain, reduced diversity is also a feature of the UK 
retail banking industry. This started in the 1970s with the 
opening up of the residential mortgage market (to break-up 
the ‘monopoly’ of building societies), continuing with the 
demutualisation of the largest societies and their subsequent 
take-over by established publicly listed banks before and 
after the crisis. In addition to this external threat, building 
societies have consolidated their activities through a series 
of mergers, reducing the number of active societies from 
481 in 1970 to 44 in 2017 (BSA 2018) and creating one 
large building society, Nationwide (holding more than 60% 
of sub-sector assets). Credit unions which flourished in the 
US, Canada and Ireland, have never moved beyond niche 
status in the UK, despite some modest growth (Bank of Eng-
land 2019).
In the UK, civil society has exercised voice by lobby-
ing for and responding to public inquests using two chan-
nels. First, civil society organised immediate (G20 protest 
in 2009) and more sustained (Occupy London) forms of 
protest, as well as public campaigns for change (MoveY-
ourMoney; The Robin Hood Tax, Positive Money) and alter-
native economy think tanks such as NEF, RePublica and 
Demos (see, for example, Positive Money 2012). But dissat-
isfaction with post-crisis reform was soon absorbed into the 
wider anti-austerity movement as the long-term socio-eco-
nomic consequence of the GFC outgrew the ‘financial crisis 
frame’ (Pianta 2013), leading to more direct engagement 
with the policy process. Second, although often excluded 
from policy making at a formal level, civil society groups 
have submitted responses to regulatory initiatives, for exam-
ple, in response to the Independent Commission on Bank-
ing (Positive Money 2012; Ford and Philipponnat 2013). In 
Europe, civil society has established Finance Watch in 2011 
to ‘act as a public interest counter-weight to the financial 
lobby’ (ibid: 188).
In terms of post-crisis responsibility in the UK, public 
bodies (regulatory agencies and government) have been the 
main source of initiatives, reflecting frustration about the 
limited changes to culture and behaviour from early and 
sustained civil society action. The rediscovery of regula-
tion is in marked contrast to the previous explicit com-
mitment to the deregulation of financial services since the 
mid-1980s (Moran 1991) and, albeit short-lived, encour-
agement of business-led CR using a market-based approach 
(Shaefer 2013, p. 243). While there have been industry-led 
programmes in financial services (such as around financial 
literacy), there is little evidence that these have led to sig-
nificant changes in behaviour and business models (Froud 
et al. 2017). Banking crisis, and the ensuing unprecedented 
government intervention to support the sector, has led to a 
marked rebalancing with changes to the regulatory frame-
work and a more active interest in retail banking by govern-
ment, especially to increase competition.
Government-led ICR initiatives have taken three forms: 
promotion of new entrant—challenger—banks; encourage-
ment of lending to SMEs; and the principle of ‘treating cus-
tomers fairly’ (considered in the next section of the paper). 
The first of these rests on the assumption that promoting 
competition is the mechanism to encourage existing retail 
banks to treat their customers well; this is a priority that 
has led to a succession of investigations into the structure 
of the UK retail banking sector, the most recent of which 
reported in 2016 (CMA 2016). The encouragement of chal-
lenger banks—including offering substantial financial sup-
port to some new entrants under a Capability and Innovation 
Fund2 and simplifying the process of obtaining a banking 
licence—represents an attempt to reshape the market. Unlike 
in Spain, however, there is no explicit preference for differ-
ent kinds of banks such as savings banks. While a number 
of new banks have entered the PCA and business markets, 
this has had limited effect on the overall banking structure 
as many of these are small and present niche offers; indeed, 
a process of consolidation of new banks is already underway 
(English 2019).
The second main government objective, to foster lending 
to SMEs, has led to initiatives directed at existing banks, 
such as ‘Project Merlin’ launched in 2011. After this project 
failed to meet targets (Independent 2012), a new initiative 
‘Funding for Lending’ ran from 2012 to 2018 (Bank of Eng-
land 2012)3 with similar results. Despite this, the limited 
extent of lending by banks to SMEs remains an official con-
cern, and a new venture, the Business Bank, was established 
in 2013 with direct government support (FT 2014). Overall, 
UK government actions to encourage more responsibil-
ity across the industry have taken various forms including 
financial inducements and projects but these have largely not 
involved effective coalition building. Within these broader 
national contexts, the next section considers two examples 
which show a greater degree of coalition building reflecting 
combinations of power, legitimacy, magnitude and urgency 
and mobilising new and existing organisations.
2 This fund has £425 million held in trust at the Bank of England and 
administered by Banking Competition Remedies Ltd to be spent in 
four rounds or pools to support challenger banks that explicitly tar-
get SMEs. This fund was established after agreement between the UK 
Government and the European Commission to implement the £775 
million RBS state aid alternative remedies package, resulting from 
the bailing out of RBS and the subsequent inability to sell Williams 
and Glyn Bank. See https ://bcr-ltd.com/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2018/09/
Banki ng-Compe titio n-Remed ies-media -facts heet_final .pdf for more 
details.
3 This was supplemented by the Term Lending Scheme from 2016–
2018 which underwrote an additional £15bn of lending, triggered by 
the Government’s attempt to boost the UK economy in the pre-Brexit 
period. https ://www.ft.com/conte nt/dcd16 a09-1726-3904-909b-a0195 
f2054 77.
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Industry Corporate Responsibility 
Initiatives: Two Examples of Coalitions 
and Public Action
Following our theoretical framework, we present two 
emblematic examples to analyse how the magnitude and 
urgency of industry bad practices provoked coalition build-
ing initiatives from civil society and changes at industry 
level. These were selected because they reflect important 
and legitimate issues where banks have acted against the 
interests of their own customers. In both cases, civil society 
action was central in helping to collectively organise the 
interests of individual customers and in doing so increase 
the urgency of the problem and the legitimacy of the 
action; moreover, civil society action prompts some form of 
response by government and other public authorities which 
is necessary to effect change. In each case, we describe the 
problem, the characteristics of the negotiation process, the 
actors involved, the reaction of public bodies and industry 
and the limitations of this process, taking into account the 
different contexts.
The first case, protecting mortgage debtors in Spain, is a 
significant and unprecedented example of mobilisation of 
power given Spain’s low level of consumer activism. In this 
instance, a coalition was built between bank customers with 
mortgage arrears and other citizens concerned with social 
justice. The bottom-up coalition drew power and legitimacy 
from the magnitude of the problem (around half a million 
households facing or experiencing eviction by their banks) 
and the urgency that relates to the potential and visible harm 
that eviction can cause, especially to vulnerable people. 
PAH, as a new, civil society organisation worked effectively 
and persistently to exert pressure on banks via judicial action 
and, later, government action. The direct outcome is changes 
in bank behaviour in relation to these affected households, 
but this has not extended to any more general embedding of 
responsibility. There may, however, be more enduring effects 
through the demonstration of effective civic action, making 
future stakeholder coalitions more likely.
The second case, the response to mis-selling of finan-
cial products by banks to UK customers, was made urgent 
through the action of an established, well-resourced civil 
society organisation, Citizens Advice. This organisation 
used legal process to challenge government inaction in 
response to massive mis-selling which affected millions of 
bank customers. While the failure of an insurance policy on 
a financial product such as a loan is perhaps less serious for 
the individual customer than a potential eviction, the sheer 
scale in the second case provided legitimacy. The success-
ful legal action rebalanced power away from the banks in 
relation to this issue and required government to align itself 
more explicitly with customer interests. Again, this has been 
a high profile and extended action, yet the extent of respon-
sibility has been limited to specific redress, not behavioural 
change by retail banks. Nor has it shifted government policy 
in ways that prevent future mis-selling.
These cases are developed using secondary data to inform 
understanding of the nature and scale of the process, the 
actions taken by civil society, formal responses by govern-
ment and public authorities and the perspectives of citizens, 
as set out in the media of different kinds. In each case, the 
secondary data are used to trace the development of the 
problem, the critical interventions by civil society and the 
forms of response by government and other public authori-
ties, including aspects of coalition building, and the extent 
of short- and long-term change. The major sources for the 
Spanish case are statistical data from CGPJ (The Span-
ish National Council on Judiciary), official court reports, 
PAH reports and media articles. UK data are drawn from 
regulatory authorities, Citizens Advice, media and other 
commentaries.
Example 1: Protecting Mortgage Debtors Against 
Repossession in Spain
This first example is concerned with the relationship between 
banks and residential mortgage customers: the effectiveness 
of coalition building is a consequence of broadening the 
issue beyond a simple market relation to invoke the wider 
social justice implications of bank behaviour, which was 
critical to establishing legitimacy. What is also striking 
about this example is that civil society was able to co-opt 
judicial processes to more effectively bring government into 
alignment. However, while there are demonstrable changes 
in bank behaviour in some respects, as outlined below, there 
is no clear evidence of underlying ethical shifts in banking 
practice led by the industry.
Lending practices in Spain before the crisis increased 
home ownership. After the crisis, however, rising unem-
ployment contributed to the growing number of mortgage 
holders unable to meet payments, resulting in mass evictions 
by the banks: an estimated 500,000 releases or evictions 
occurred between 2008 and 2013 (PAH 2014). Public outcry 
about the social consequences of eviction and homelessness 
led to the establishment of a civil society movement, the 
Spanish Platform of People Affected by Mortgages (PAH) 
in 2009, which campaigned for more considerate treatment 
of distressed debtors. PAH is notable as a social movement 
because it changed the framework surrounding the eviction 
problem, while also creating nationwide awareness of the 
resulting injustice. De Weerdt and García’s (2016) analysis 
of this innovative social movement found that PAH empow-
ers people through solidaristic actions to place collective 
pressure on legislative bodies, governments and banks. 
Newly established collective communication channels 
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enabled these groups to reach agreements with banks to 
renegotiate or even condone debts, or to extract socially 
beneficial terms from banks, such as payment in kind or 
a social rent. These authors conclude that PAH has been 
successful in arguing that the debt problems experienced by 
Spanish households are not the result of individual failure 
but a consequence of business decision making and practices 
that put profit ahead of the consumers.
The success of the campaign against evictions reflects 
coalition building around an urgent issue. PAH enlisted the 
EU Court of Justice, which ruled against the evictions and 
gave Spanish courts new power to stay evictions (FT 2013b). 
Resulting legal and social pressure led to the issuance of the 
Royal Decree Law 6/2012—a mechanism that allows urgent 
laws to be passed—to protect mortgage borrowers. This 
introduced a series of measures, including a voluntary Code 
of Good Banking Practice which included exceptional meas-
ures for the resolution of defaults of people in difficult social 
conditions. A subsequent law (1/2013) and amendments 
formalised detailed measures to protect mortgage debtors, 
debt restructuring and social rent, and thereby recognised 
the social consequences of eviction which had been initially 
ignored by national government.4 In an attempt to prevent 
future bad practice the law also promotes more responsi-
ble lending, limiting mortgages to a period of 30 years and 
a maximum loan-to-value of 80%. However, the law does 
not universally and retrospectively alter payments as PAH 
had argued for, though it includes a two-year suspension 
of evictions in cases of ‘special vulnerability’. As a result, 
property can only be repossessed and sold when restructur-
ing is impracticable under specific conditions, according to 
the Code of Good Banking Practice.
The PAH example illustrates social innovation by organ-
ised citizens fighting for social justice. The coalition has 
incorporated support from 200 collectives and labour unions, 
more than 100 city councils which have approved motions in 
favour of the demands of PAH and from political groups in 
14 regional parliaments across Spain (Bhandar 2015). This 
has produced political action which has shaped governance 
through creation of new mechanisms for collectively nego-
tiating housing debts with financial institutions, while also 
influencing new local and regional regulations for access to 
housing for mortgage victims. By reframing the issue as a 
collective problem—governments have used an ‘individual 
approach’, the PAH has focused on collective responses to 
social problems—PAH’s campaign contributed to new ways 
of conceptualising and approaching policy problems (Pradel 
et al. 2013). The success of PAH is underlined by subse-
quent legal action brought against Blackstone, the largest 
owner of housing in Spain with some 40,000 homes. PAH 
has accused Blackstone of committing a crime of ‘hoard-
ing’ empty homes and ‘deceptive alteration of the price of 
things’—buying repossessed homes at a low price and then 
withdrawing them from the market to sustain high rental 
values and purchase prices—which are illegal (PAH 2018a). 
This is a particularly sensitive political issue as social hous-
ing for rent provides only 1% of Spanish homes (compared 
with around 20% in the United Kingdom, France or Ger-
many) and there are 3.4 million empty homes.
While a remarkable and unusual example of organised cit-
izen action, it is important to ask whether this has enhanced 
responsibility more generally in Spanish retail banking. The 
effectiveness of PAH’s social action and heightened aware-
ness of bad practice has encouraged consumer associations 
and lawyers to engage in a context where traditionally there 
has been limited consumer mobilisation. However, it is not 
clear that corporate behaviour has changed more generally. 
For example, between 2007 and 2018 there were more than 
500,000 evictions in Spain due to mortgage non-payment 
and, in recent years, this figure has been increased by rent 
evictions (PAH 2018b). Rather than preventing future uneth-
ical behaviour, further bad banking practices have emerged. 
The insertion of floor clauses in mortgage agreements, for 
example, meant that consumers would not benefit from 
reductions in EURIBOR rates, but were liable to pay more 
if this rate went up. This was deemed an ‘abusive practice’ 
by the courts and a 2017 royal decree established an extra-
judicial channel to settle disputes (BOE 2017) and by end of 
2019, over €2.2 billion was returned to Spanish consumers.5 
These and other practices have undermined public trust in 
banks, with significant judicial proceedings still awaiting 
resolution (Spanish Central Bank 2019). Overall, this case 
demonstrates that banks’ reaction to civil society pressure 
may not result in any generalised corporate responsibility 
but can have issue-specific consequences. Business model 
pressures remain focused on a single-bottom line and civil 
society initiatives lack the (legislative) muscle to drive 
meaningful and far-reaching changes in corporate behav-
iour across an industry. Government action was necessary 
to achieve the outcomes supported by civil society and, later, 
the judiciary, though there was no immediate response by 
government to enact structural policy changes to prevent 
poor behaviour by banks.
5 See: https ://elpai s.com/econo mia/2019/12/11/actua lidad /15760 
98707 _97432 2.html.
4 For details, see Law 1/2013 Measures To Strengthen The Protec-
tion Of Mortgage Borrowers, Restructuring Debt And Social Rental, 
Royal Decree Law 1/2015 of 27 February and Royal Decree Law 
5/2017 of 17 March.
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Example 2: ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ 
and Mis‑selling in the UK
Treating customers fairly (TCF) has been an officially 
endorsed general principle in the UK since 2006 (Shaefer 
2013), applying not only in banking but in other utility sec-
tors like energy. TCF in retail banking was renewed post-
crisis after a review of the regulatory framework on financial 
services and the creation of the new regulator, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA). TCF encapsulates a basic ethical 
principle to which all organisations regulated by the FCA 
must adhere: a bank ‘must pay due regard to the interests of 
its customers and treat them fairly’. If the principle is embed-
ded in bank behaviour then it should deliver six outcomes 
which collectively represent ‘fair’ treatment (FCA 2013). 
This is not a regulatory framework, nor a set of benchmarks 
for behaviour; enforcement is via an Ombudsman and inves-
tigations when things go wrong. However, under a self-inter-
est argument, it might be expected that banks would have 
an interest in following TCF to ensure that (mis)treatment 
of customers does not contribute to future scandals, reputa-
tional damage and fines, as well as contributing to rebuilding 
trust in the retail financial services sector.
The survival of TCF as a regulatory initiative reflects the 
continued need for improved transparency and fair treatment, 
rather than its success in enhancing and enshrining respon-
sibility. The renewal of TCF in 2013 was amidst a series of 
mis-selling scandals, most notably of payment protection 
insurance (PPI), an insurance policy sold by banks and other 
financial institutions linked specifically to debt and credit 
products. The scale of mis-selling suggests a mass failure by 
the sector to follow the TCF ethical principle (and a failure 
of public authorities to take remedial action). Moreover, this 
was not the first instance of mis-selling by UK banks. Earlier 
mass episodes of unacceptable behaviour in relation to sell-
ing private pensions and endowment mortgages in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Ferran 2012) had not reformed the incentives 
systems and culture within banks which allowed serial mis-
selling to thrive. The original failures of mis-selling were 
compounded by the way that banks dealt with customers 
who complained. As a result, fines were imposed by the 
FCA on some banks for mis-handling complaints (see, for 
example, FCA 2015).
In the specific case of the mis-selling of PPI, the inter-
ests of customers were taken forward by Citizens Advice—
a network of charities that provide free legal information 
and advice—which became increasingly aware of the large 
number of policy holders who had made claims under 
their policies and been refused pay-outs (Citizens Advice 
2015). As PPI products became more widely sold, it was 
more likely that they were unsuitable or at least represented 
very poor value. Citizens Advice noted in 2005 that there 
were estimated to be 20 million live PPI policies with an 
annual premium of £5.3bn, compared with £8bn and £9.5bn, 
respectively, for property and motor insurance. Through 
their individual charities they observed the massive extent 
of customer dissatisfaction, though this was disputed by the 
industry. In particular, it appeared that lower income and 
vulnerable customers were more likely to have been mis-sold 
these insurance products (Citizens Advice 2005).
Citizens Advice collected individual cases to make a 
‘super complaint’ to the regulator, the Financial Services 
Authority, in 2005. Public authorities responded to this civil 
society action by putting in place a system of fines and com-
pensation for customers who could demonstrate they had 
been mis-sold PPI. Far from recognising their responsibili-
ties, banks via their trade association the British Bankers’ 
Association (BBA) initially mounted a legal challenge to 
the requirement to pay compensation and indeed continued 
selling these products for years. In 2011, the BBA lost a 
legal case against new rules intended to prevent mis-selling, 
which were to be applied retrospectively, hence opening up 
further claims from customers (Guardian 2011). In the end, 
the industry had no option but to pay the regulatory fines and 
customer compensation. UK retail banks created enormous 
provisions in their financial accounts to meet the compen-
sation costs6: by 2019, some £36bn had been paid out by 
British banks (FT 2019). The issue of corporate responsibil-
ity is relevant in two ways: the first is the sale of the finan-
cial product by banks, including whether it was suitable for 
the customer and clearly explained to them; the second is 
how banks handled the complaints of mis-selling. To some 
extent, the second issue gained a heightened significance in 
some of the reporting by public authorities, perhaps because 
this could be measured and audited more easily than the 
more fundamental concerns about how banks treat custom-
ers. For example, the FCA notes in 2014 that firms have 
improved the way that they handle complaints, though does 
not comment on whether selling practices are more ethical 
(FCA 2014).
The regulator has since banned certain products and 
attempted to address selling practices more generally. How-
ever, a good test of industry-led responsibility might be 
whether bank business models have become less reliant on 
cross-selling (often unsuitable) financial products, thereby 
embedding the principle of fair treatment of customers 
into routine practices. While banks have withdrawn some 
products, as required by the regulator, evidence of further 
mis-selling has followed the PPI scandal, suggesting that 
TCF is still not being adopted by banks. For example, in 
6 Between 2011 and November 2013, the banks paid out £13.4 bn in 
compensation with total provisions reaching nearly £20 bn in early 
2014 (FT 2014). The total cost of compensation for PPI is estimated 
at £34.2bn by March 2019 (FCA 2019).
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late 2013, Lloyds Bank was fined £28 m and expected to 
pay out £100 m in compensation after a new expose about 
mis-selling a range of financial products by staff (Guardian 
2013). It is no surprise that claims management has become 
an industry in its own right: these companies are looking out 
for new potential sources of mass claims, including mort-
gages (again) and packaged current accounts which offer 
a bundle of services in return for a fee (FT 2019; Which? 
2018; Francis 2019).
In this example, civil society action was central to 
addressing the massive consequences of mis-selling, by 
helping to collectively organise the interests of individual 
customers and in doing so increase both the urgency of the 
problem and the legitimacy of the action. More broadly, the 
sustained failure of UK banks to improve their treatment of 
customers has provided an interesting opportunity for social 
movements to raise public awareness. For example, Move 
Your Money claims some success in encouraging switch-
ing away from the big banks; though the impact on their 
business models or behaviour is uncertain. In essence, the 
initiative represented a market-based approach to irrespon-
sibility, with consumers encouraged to exercise their power 
by changing their bank.
To sum up, this section has analysed two initiatives where 
actions led by civil society, with responses from government 
and other public bodies, have had some impact on the bank-
ing sector. In both cases, action to address a lack of corpo-
rate responsibility is the response to the results of coalitions 
formed around banks, not a spontaneous act or corporate 
priority. To the extent that ICR has been enhanced, it is reac-
tive not embedded in bank practices. In the Spanish example 
of mortgage holders facing eviction, civil society pressure 
has worked through public authorities to convert social 
concern into regulatory requirements which strengthened 
protection for borrowers. In the UK example of responses 
to widespread mis-selling, civil society action had the effect 
of raising the profile and achieving redress for individuals 
via massive compensation, but without necessarily chang-
ing bank behaviour. The implications of these examples are 
explored in the final section.
Discussion and Conclusion
This concluding section reflects on the initiatives discussed 
in the paper and their implications for understanding corpo-
rate responsibility at an industry level. Here we come back 
to our theoretical framework to highlight several issues aris-
ing from the empirical analysis that can be used to frame 
subsequent research and to inform policy. The paper set out 
to address the question: whether and how public action (via 
civil society and/or government) can meaningfully affect 
industry-wide corporate responsibility behaviour by retail 
banks. Focusing on Spain and the UK, we have provided an 
overview of developments in this sector since the GFC to 
highlight the very limited extent of industry-led corporate 
responsibility. Two examples which represent exceptional 
cases of civil society action making problems visible—and 
to some extent mobilising government and other public 
authorities—have been analysed to explore the ways in 
which such action reflects power and legitimacy of actors 
and the urgency and magnitude of the issues in the building 
of coalitions around banks. The examples were chosen to 
highlight civil society responses to responsibility problems 
across an industry, as well as the importance of some follow 
up through policy or regulatory change. Through these we 
demonstrate the value of focusing on corporate behaviour at 
the industry rather than the firm level.
The banking industry examples analysed have allowed 
us to explore the cultural business ethics perspective 
(Beschorner and Hajduk 2017) in which the industry is a 
frame for actors linked to each other by a web of shared 
beliefs and network-like relations, and with apparently simi-
lar understandings of CSR (the materiality of issues, the 
legitimacy of stakeholder demands, and the role of govern-
ments). Within an industry context, responsibility can be 
substantiated and thus made clear and manageable for com-
panies and their stakeholders. Retail banking is an appro-
priate case to illustrate the significance of responsibility 
initiatives at industry level, particularly in relation to the 
inadequacy of firm-level CR to prevent or respond to prob-
lems. The financial crisis and ensuing challenges to business 
models added urgency and magnitude in ways that could 
potentially unsettle established behaviours and strengthen 
legitimacy of civil society organisations. As argued in the 
paper, retail banks have a longstanding engagement with 
company-level CR but this has not prepared the industry for 
dealing with the consequences of irresponsibility or unethi-
cal decisions through initiatives or preventative actions.
The analysis shows that in these retail banking cases, ICR 
came about through coalition building by stakeholders. It 
is evident that proactive or industry-led corporate respon-
sibility was limited to more trivial issues (Tashman and 
Raelin 2013) and there was little evidence of any incentive 
for industry collective action (Sternberg 2011) to initiate 
change. Instead, banks have been compelled to act following 
the mobilisation of power through legal processes and (even-
tually) the enrolling of governments. Overall, the analysis in 
this paper has illustrated how corporate responsibility at the 
sector level in retail banking is, first, the product of context-
specific processes of negotiation between the sector, civil 
society and public authorities, on behalf of customers and 
other stakeholders; and, second, has only limited momentum 
in enabling behavioural change beyond the initial catalysing 
events.
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In both cases, and particularly so in the Spanish case, 
coalitions are created in highly politically charged con-
texts. Set up in response to widespread bad practice and 
government inactivity, PAH was initially unable to claim 
legitimacy. Nonetheless, the scale of the problem addressed 
and the public interest created soon established PAH as a 
legitimate civil society actor, able to legally challenge both 
governments and banks. PAH effectively created a political 
environment which allowed the diffusion of its objectives, 
in line with the argument of Carberry et al. (2017). This 
pivoted around the idea that evicting mortgage debtors was 
morally and politically unacceptable. In the UK case, the 
issues were clearly less politically charged, yet the sheer 
scale of the issue—the millions of bank customers sold inap-
propriate insurance products—created a legitimate political 
force based on evidence of unethical practices. Here, our 
analysis supports Myllykangas et al. (2010), who argue that 
legitimacy has to be socially constructed, rather than aris-
ing from priorities set by government or industry. The post-
2008 campaigns against banks are to this extent reflective of 
broader movements about capitalism, inequality and climate 
justice, as well as the specific unethical practices.
Our examples support the argument that attempts to 
meaningfully influence ICR require stakeholders to possess 
both power and legitimacy (Neville et al. 2011). Civil soci-
ety has limited direct power but can access it through actions 
and coalitions: in both examples, civil society stakeholders 
derived power through collective action. The UK example 
showed how mis-sold customers were brought together by 
Citizens Advice, a civil society organisation with legitimacy 
based on longstanding efforts on behalf of consumers. In the 
Spanish case, action came about through creation of a pres-
sure group with wider membership to campaign initially for 
mortgage debtors; subsequently, PAH has been the basis of 
wider campaigning on issues relating to rights to housing.
Such collectivisation is critical because, although retail 
banking customers are legitimated stakeholders who should 
be able to exert pressure on business to act responsibly, it 
is difficult to articulate individual power for many rea-
sons. First, information and resource asymmetries between 
banking institutions and customers reduce individual’s 
power despite the ethical legitimacy and magnitude of 
their demands. Customer financial illiteracy and mimetic 
practices of most retail banks also constrain the ability and 
opportunities of individual customers to negotiate with 
banks. Even when they are aware of their rights, the costs of 
pursuing them will be an obstacle to individual remediation. 
However, our examples show how under specific conditions, 
the magnitude or scale of unethical practices provides oppor-
tunities to collectively organise, create visibility for the issue 
and accumulate pressures for subsequent—albeit limited—
action by government and other public authorities. The abil-
ity of civil society to formalise claims of misbehaviour then 
creates opportunities to effectively engage in negotiations 
around remediation, despite resource limitations. As we have 
seen, the magnitude and urgency of customers claims and 
demands (e.g. see Mitchell et al. 1997) have allowed civil 
society to mobilise additional financial, political, legal or 
other resources that supplement individual power and com-
pel change through the intermediation of regulatory or other 
changes. These were the main conditions that allowed effec-
tive actions through a process of negotiation and coalition 
building in our examples. Thus, civil society action was cen-
tral to addressing the massive consequences of mis-selling, 
by helping to collectively organise the interests of individual 
customers, represent them in legal processes and in doing 
so increase the urgency of the problem. It should be noted, 
however, that even though initiatives led by civil society can 
lead to changes in the way industries are required to act, this 
does not imply that government priorities or objectives are 
necessarily aligned with those of civil society stakeholders. 
Where they do exist then, stakeholder coalitions are tempo-
rary and contingent.
In understanding how stakeholder pressure works, we 
can draw a distinction between consumer and social pres-
sures. Consumer pressures involve those directly affected 
by irresponsibility such as mis-selling, whereas social pres-
sures reflect a broader constituency: for example, PAH is 
not simply comprised of those who are or might be evicted 
but represents a more general discontent about bank behav-
iour on behalf of affected citizens. This would seem to be 
a stronger and extendable basis for a coalition of interests 
as it presents problems as a general failure to meet citizen 
needs, rather than harms done to individual customers. Coa-
lition building here responds to ethical issues which relate 
to housing in this specific instance but could equally cover 
access to energy, water and sanitation, transport, legal aid 
or other essential material and social infrastructures. When 
the unethical behaviour of banks or other industries impacts 
on citizens’ welfare or even their human rights, corporate 
responsibility becomes a political issue and legislative, exec-
utive and judicial powers can be used to guarantee or at least 
support these rights. In these instances, it is social pressure 
through established or new civil society organisations rather 
than individual pressures, which are effective. Here, we can 
draw another interesting comparison. While PAH in Spain 
initially lacked legitimacy as a new organisation seeking 
power to change bank behaviour, Citizens Advice in the UK 
had more immediate credibility, as well as legal and other 
resources to draw on. Yet, Citizens Advice is also limited in 
scope by its success in advocating for consumer rights, while 
PAH can develop innovative responses to institutional fail-
ures through creating new stakeholder coalitions outside its 
original ambit. While the specific nature of the civil society 
demand and the context in which problems arise are likely 
to be important, the negotiating capacity of the actors is a 
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driving force. As a result, PAH was able to make evictions 
an issue that could mobilise legal and political response even 
while other contemporaneous civil society demands, such as 
around public health and education, climate change or tax 
reforms, did not deliver the same level of success.
Notwithstanding these distinctions, in each case responses 
by public bodies have been effectively mobilised through 
the accretion of pressure, with regulatory or policy action 
triggered by an event (e.g. the super complaint on PPI mis-
selling). Effectiveness here is dependent on the ability of 
civil society to draw on legal or regulatory processes that 
governments cannot ignore. But, even where reactions to 
industry-level problems have been effective, they have taken 
time to initiate and some have attracted resistance. In this 
sense their development reflects processes of negotiation 
that take place outside the sector, and indeed in the PPI com-
pensation case, legally challenged by retail banking interests. 
In the Spanish case, the judicialisation of the process and the 
role played by the courts have transformed individual claims 
into societal and political claims with regulatory reforms. As 
for the banks, the industry response can be characterised as 
reactive. In both cases, banks fought both civil society and 
regulators to limit their financial responsibilities until the 
point where they had to comply and, in the UK example, 
face unprecedented costs. Interestingly, these defeats were 
followed neither by explicit actions to regain customer trust 
nor attempts to strategically manage stakeholder coalitions 
to limit external influence (Campbell 2007, p. 955). In this 
sense, the sustained failure of UK and Spanish banks to 
improve their treatment of customers (borrowers and sav-
ers) has provided an interesting opportunity for social move-
ments to raise public awareness.
While both examples discussed in the previous section 
have had a high political and media profile—and have led to 
extensive redress—there is no indication that they will solve 
the underlying problems of unethical behaviour. The limited 
effectiveness of the initiatives can be partly explained by 
the reactive processes that deliver them and by the scale of 
the challenges. To some extent this reflects the underlying 
effective power of the banking industry in relation to both 
government and civil society; but it is also a consequence 
of broader socio-economic issues. What then are the policy 
implications of this analysis?
The calls for changes to retail banking in Spain and the 
UK discussed in this paper reflect significant socio-eco-
nomic issues central to the functioning of a banking system 
and requiring coherent action across the sector, rather than 
company-level discretion. Our analysis shows that banking 
does not necessarily or effectively fulfil its intermediary 
function to support citizens and the (productive and social) 
economy (Fernández-Olit and de la Cuesta-González 2014). 
For example, banks over-lent to households in Spain to buy 
houses, while they have under-lent to SMEs in the UK. 
Retail banks have also failed to design and market prod-
ucts that meet the needs of customers in transparent ways, 
especially given many customers’ lack of financial literacy, 
asymmetrical information and inertia.
It is possible, of course, that episodes such as those we 
have analysed in this paper could eventually contribute to 
the development of industry-led corporate responsibility that 
recognised stakeholder interests and avoided such unethical 
practices in the future. Such action would obviate the need 
for regulatory responses by public authorities and would 
avoid extended, high-profile legal processes aimed at seek-
ing redress for specific customers, resulting in substantial 
financial penalties. From a self-interest argument, our exam-
ples might suggest that retail banks could change behaviour 
to avoid repeated reputational and financial damage. To this 
extent, policy implications would be limited perhaps to the 
importance of safeguarding and promoting opportunities for 
civic action to support accountability. This would imply that 
the industry assumes stakeholder interest as a goal itself and 
not as a means to other ends.
Our analysis would suggest caution, however, in assum-
ing such an outcome because of the persistence of share-
holder value as a corporate objective for most banks (Froud 
et al. 2017). The Spanish and UK examples provide different 
contexts for the enactment of shareholder value: in Spain, 
rapid changes as the sector has moved towards a less diverse 
retail banking ecosystem provide an unstable backdrop to 
high-profile stakeholder initiatives; while in the UK, mis-
selling reflects long-running problems in a retail banking 
sector where shareholder value-driven business models 
have dominated for 20 years. Though the historical context 
is different, changing bank behaviour in both countries is 
made difficult by the imperative for financial returns in busi-
ness environments that are more challenging. This relates 
not simply to normative notions of ethical behaviour but 
to questions of practicality and attainability (Raiborn and 
Payne 1990, p. 885). There has been recent debate more 
broadly about the importance of long-term corporate objec-
tives and meeting the needs of stakeholders more broadly, 
as illustrated by the US Business Roundtable restatement of 
the purpose of the corporation (Business RoundTable 2019), 
but there is little evidence as yet that this presages significant 
change in business models.
In such an unpromising environment for progressive 
policy, several possibilities can be highlighted. First, dif-
ferent behaviours may be more likely to come through 
encouraging new kinds of banks (e.g. mutuals) which 
offer customers a different model; or through controls on 
banking which more vigorously protect customers from 
unethical behaviour, rather than relying on compensation 
after the event. In the case of retail banking, development 
of a more relational business model in which the needs 
of customers can be met with appropriate products and 
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services and delivered with better advice and accurate 
information may help avoid actions that disadvantage cus-
tomers (Fernández-Olit and de la Cuesta-González 2014). 
Digitalisation processes in the banking industry could 
help in principle as banks have access to large amounts 
of data, which allows them to offer personalised products 
and services to customers to meet their financial needs 
and not just business objectives (García Montalvo 2014). 
But digitalisation processes will not necessarily improve 
transparency and the quality of financial advice and mar-
keting. Some early scandals involving fintech firms suggest 
that these new actors have picked up ‘some bad old habits’ 
displayed by larger incumbents (FT 2016).
Second, government cannot abdicate corporate respon-
sibility to (product or capital) markets, but equally, coali-
tions with civil society are important in directing gov-
ernment and holding it to account. The examples in this 
paper illustrate a form of negotiated power with govern-
ment responding to civil society concerns. Government 
also have their own objectives which may direct bank 
behaviour in particular ways, such as supporting lending 
to SMEs to encourage growth, or promoting residential 
mortgages to expand home ownership, just as they may 
have reasons why they avoid tougher legislative and regu-
latory frameworks.
These kinds of mediation and capture are likely when 
the underlying issues like evictions are fundamentally 
political and government must be seen to respond to public 
outrage. The challenge for civil society is to align its inter-
ests with government, to create a political environment 
for the diffusion of its objectives (Carberry et al. 2017) 
and to hold government to account in terms of both legal 
obligations and societal values. Moreover, CR initiatives 
arising from stakeholder coalitions can only be a first step 
towards a more ethical banking sector where the under-
lying causes of the problem are complex. For example, 
an absence of social housing for rent or a well-regulated 
private housing sector may encourage high-risk mortgage 
lending by banks. In this context, there is a limit to what 
any kind of banking responsibility initiative can deliver 
if there are endemic problems social such as inadequate 
housing which requires separate action by government and 
other public authorities. This underlines the significance of 
our analysis beyond banking to other sectors where corpo-
rate behaviour both directly affects the quality of everyday 
life for many citizens and may be part of wider institu-
tional limits. In this sense, promotion of ethical behaviour 
by business may require broad stakeholder coalitions to 
highlight underlying problems and social priorities. The 
relevance of these problems and priorities is stronger than 
ever in the post-Covid-19 economic and financial context. 
Moreover, there should be opportunities to explore the 
capacity of actors to influence and change industry behav-
iour both individually and through coalitions.
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